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Summary 
When Wittgenstein started writing the Tractatus in June 1915, he 
believed that he was producing a theory. Accordingly, he chose a 
theoretical style of expressing his thought. Wittgenstein abandoned 
this style only toward the end of his finishing the work. He realized 
that what he was producing was not a theory but a manual for 
improving our thinking and language. Unfortunately, it was too late to 
change the architecture and style of the book: Wittgenstein simply had 
no time to do that. This drawback makes the Tractatus notoriously 
difficult to understand and is apparently the major factor that led to the 
so-called “Tractarian Wars.” 
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1. The New Archaeological Studies of Wittgenstein’s 
Tractatus 
Wittgenstein Tractarian studies have experienced a real turn in the 
last few years, a turn produced thorough chronological reconstruction 
of the composition of the Prototractatus and the publication of the 
University of Iowa Tractatus Map.
1
 The Prototractatus tools (PTT) 
are especially helpful since they give us much detailed and important 
information on the genesis of the Tractatus and its corrections made 
                                                          
1
 Both were published on the Internet: http://wittgensteinsource.org, 
http://tractatus.lib.uiowa.edu/tlp/. 
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by Wittgenstein as displayed in MS 104 (also called Bodleianus). It 
appears that Wittgenstein started writing down his “treatise” not later 
than in the last days of June 1915.
2
 He finished it late in 1918 in 12 
phases (to be discussed in § 5) of work that also included: 
 
 The Ur-Tractatus (the first 12 pages) 
 The Core-Tractatus (the first 28 pages) 
 The Proto-Prototractatus (the first 70 pages) 
 The Prototractatus proper (the first 103 pages). (Pilch, 
2018, p.106) 
 
The present paper is interpretative. It seeks to make sense of the 
new archeological work on the composition of the Tractatus. Among 
other things, our analysis shows the resolute reading of the book to be 
mistaken. It is important to remember that this influential 
interpretation was advanced more than 30 years ago by Cora Diamond 
and James Connant as an alternative reading of Wittgenstein’s work 
(Crary and Read 2002). According to it, the Tractatus consists of two 
parts—a body and a frame. To the frame pertain §§ 3.32–3.326, 4–
4.003, 4.111–12, and 6.53–4. All other paragraphs are part of the 
body. Wittgenstein considered the frame seriously, whereas all the 
remaining propositions of the book, which belong to its body, are 
written “tongue in cheek.” The main idea of the frame is expressed in 
§ 6.54 which read:  
 
My propositions serve as elucidations in the following way: anyone 
who understands me eventually recognizes them as nonsensical, when 
he has used them—as steps—to climb up beyond them. (He must, so to 
speak, throw away the ladder after he has climbed up it.).  
 
                                                          
2
 See Bazzocchi (2015, p. 339). According to Pilcher (2018, p. 132), Wittgenstein 
started writing the Tractatus two mounts later, at the end of August 1915. In the 
present paper, we will follow Bazzocchi’s dating. 
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This was the real message of the Tractatus. 
The new archeological work of the Tractatus shows that 
Wittgenstein’s book was really composed of different building blocks, 
produced in different periods of time. In a sense, it was really a 
patchwork. However, these parts were not the ones announced by the 
resolute readers. In other words, the new empirical material failed to 
support the interpretative hypothesis of the New Wittgenstinians. And, 
as in science, a hypothesis that is not supported by the empirically 
collected materials is just to be abandoned. Famous in this connection 
are the phlogiston theory of combustion, and the ether theory of 
propagation of electromagnetic or gravitational forces that were 
experimentally disproved.  
 
2. The Evolvement of Wittgenstein’s Early Thought 
In his “Notes on Logic,” “Notes Dictated to G E Moore,” and the 
first pages of Notebooks 1914–1916, Wittgenstein wrote down what 
he believed to be his logical-philosophical discoveries (Milkov 
2012).
3
 Here are the three most well-known examples of such 
discoveries:  
 
 In the “Notes on Logic” (p. 94), Wittgenstein set out that 
propositions correspond to facts (we will return to this 
discovery in § 3)—not to complexes—of the world which 
are their meaning. 
 In “Notes Dictated to G E Moore” (p. 108), he formulated 
the Doctrine of Showing. 
                                                          
3
 In 1931 Wittgenstein remembered: “When I was in Norway during the year 1913–
14, I had some thoughts of my own.” (1980b, p. 20) And a year earlier, in 1930, he 
had noted: “When before 16 years, I had the thought that the low of causality is 
meaningless and that there is a view of the world that eschews with it, I had the 
feeling of starting a new epoch.” (MS 183: 6.5.1930) In contrast, in Philosophical 
Investigations, Wittgenstein maintained that what he made were not discoveries but 
grammatical-philosophical remarks. Importantly enough, this claim went together 
with the contention that he was concerned with grammar, not with logic. 
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 In the Notebooks (p. 7), Wittgenstein advanced the idea 
that when we think and operate with language, we make 
“logical pictures” of states of affairs. 
 
 Apparently, between 1913 and June 1915, Wittgenstein was 
convinced that there was something like a logical world—in a way 
similar to what Frege would call later (in 1918/19) “the third world”—
and that his task was to make discoveries in it. In this sense, “logical 
investigations explore the nature of all things” (1953, § 89). 
Moreover, at that point in time, Wittgenstein believed that his 
philosophical discoveries were autonomous, which meant that they 
could be discovered in isolation, one by one.  
Importantly enough:  
 
 The ideas that Wittgenstein discovered in the course of 
these years were of different significance: some of them 
were fundamental, other not. Still other were practically 
useless.  
 Wittgenstein often forgot his previous discoveries, recalling 
them only after periods of time with dissimilar length, 
expressing them now in a new, different form. We are going 
to see how this side of his method of working affected the 
composition of the Tractatus in §§ 3 and 7.  
 Wittgenstein believed that his discoveries fitted together 
perfectly well—in a sort of a pre-established harmony—
even if one must develop them a little bit further to make 
them fit together perfectly well. (In such cases, Wittgenstein 
formulated new propositions whose task was to help fit the 
old discoveries, or building blocks, together; cf. § 6.) 
Unfortunately, as we will see in the following, 
Wittgenstein’s old and new discoveries did not always fit 
together. 
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These traits of Wittgenstein’s work shaped the process of 
composing the Tractatus. 
 
3. Wittgenstein’s Key Discovery 
The main claim in this paper is that the discovery which made 
Wittgenstein confident that he was ready to start writing his treatise 
was guided by the remark made in the Notebooks on May 9, 1915: 
“The proposition is the picture of the fact.” (p. 46) In contrast, when 
he introduced the term picture on September 29, 1914, and also in the 
next few months, he claimed that the proposition was the picture of a 
state of affairs, not of facts (pp. 7f., 25, 34). But why was this, prima 
facie, minor difference so important to Wittgenstein?  
Wittgenstein had used the term fact even before that. Actually, this 
was the great innovation in “Notes on Logic” and in “Notes Dictated 
to G E Moore” (see § 2). From August 1913 till May 1914, however, 
Wittgenstein maintained that propositions corresponded to facts, not 
that they pictured facts. But the first months after Wittgenstein 
introduced the notion of picture and picturing on September 29, 1914, 
he always used it together with the notion of the state of affairs. 
Intriguingly, the term “state of affairs” was introduced nine days 
earlier, on September 20, 1914. So it is legitimate to ask if the 
introduction of the concept of picturing was its implication. 
But let us return to the question: Why was the discovery that “the 
proposition is the picture of the facts” so important to him? We 
maintain that the answer to this question is to be sought in the critique 
Frege addressed to him—and to Russell—in December 1912. (Milkov 
2013) Frege attacked (Russell’s and) Wittgenstein’s decision to 
identify complexes with facts, pointing out that “a complex is not like 
a fact. For example, it could be said that a complex, unlike a fact, 
moved from one place to another.”4 Frege also stated that, if an object 
were a part of a fact, the fact would be larger than the object. In effect, 
Frege held that, whereas “a complex is a spatial object, composed of 
                                                          
4
 Wittgenstein (1974, p. 199; 1964, p. 301). 
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spatial objects,” a fact is not.5 Facts are something like organic unities, 
a kind of living entities.
6
 Especially, the idea that when we understand 
propositions we grasp spatial complexes struck Frege as mistaken. He 
argued, instead, that in such cases, we understand one thing, namely 
the thought that we grasp, which can be either true or false. It sharply 
differs from the spatial complex that is segmented. Later, in 
“Thoughts”—perhaps stimulated through his discussion with 
Wittgenstein in December 1912—Frege defined “fact” as “a thought 
that is true” (1918/19, p. 368). 
Wittgenstein took the first step in digesting and adopting Frege’s 
criticism in his critical remarks to Russell’s book project Theory of 
Knowledge (June 1913), and then in “Notes on Logic” (September 
1913). His argument was (we have already mentioned it in § 2) that 
“the meaning of a proposition is that fact which actually corresponds 
to it” (pp. 94, 112). This claim tied up with another one: the fact is the 
proposition’s “truth-maker” (p. 95).  
As we already have seen, however, when Wittgenstein introduced 
(aka discovered) the “picture-theory” on September 29, 1914, he 
connected it with state of affairs, not with facts. In other words, for 
more than seven months, perhaps out of enthusiasm over his new 
discovery, the picture theory, he forgot the lesson he had received 
from Frege. Indeed, states of affairs are much more “complexy” than 
facts. In particular, they indicate that there are wholes (situations), the 
parts of which—“things”—reciprocally relate to one another 
(Mulligan 1985; Milkov 2020a, pp. 98, 106). Apparently, 
Wittgenstein needed more time to orient himself in his own 
discoveries. 
But why were pictures thus different from conventional 
propositions? The answer to this question can be found in a remark 
made by Wittgenstein approximately at the same time, on April 4, 
                                                          
5
 Ibidem. 
6
 It becomes clear, at this point, that the clash between Frege’s position and that of 
Russell–Wittgenstein in December 1912 was a form of a confrontation between the 
German and the British philosophical traditions. (Milkov 2015, 2020a)  
73 
 
1914 (1979, p. 26). He now realized, perhaps echoing Frege’s 
suggestion about the nature of facts, that pictures are living entities: a 
picture “presents a state of affairs … like a tableau vivant” (lebendes 
Bild; “like a living picture,” in Ogden’s translation of Tractatus 
4.0311). Conventional propositions, in contrast, are not living entities. 
Wittgenstein’s key discovery of May 9, 1915 was made in this 
context. Now he found out that “the proposition is the picture of the 
fact” (p. 46).  
It deserves notice that this was not an easy birth. Only three weeks 
before that, on April 15, Wittgenstein had complained: “I cannot bring 
out how far the proposition is the picture of the situation [state of 
affairs]. I am almost inclined to give up all my efforts.” (p. 41) The 
discovery that propositions picture facts resolved the problem. 
The most important implication of this discovery was that 
Wittgenstein now found out that there was something identical 
between the picture and the fact:
7
 the pictorial (or logical) form. The 
decisive point at stake here is identity, not a correspondence. This 
automatically implied that, as Wittgenstein put it, “I can devise 
different pictures of the fact. … But what is characteristic of the fact 
will be the same in all these pictures.” (pp. 46f.—italics added) The 
only necessary condition for this is that all these pictures have as their 
meaning the same particular fact they were modelling.  
But the discovery of May 9, 1915 had further implications for 
Wittgenstein’s logical philosophy. Above all, the (partial) identity 
between pictures and facts implied that the language and the world 
are, in the sense of this identity, the same. Wittgenstein, however, did 
not stop here. Shortly afterward he postulated no less than six different 
partial identical ontological–logical levels: (i) the world, (ii) the fact, 
(iii) the logical picture, (iv) the thought, (v) the proposition, and (vi) 
the general propositional form.  
                                                          
7
 In a sense, with this understanding, Wittgenstein rehabilitated the identity theory of 
truth Russell abandoned after he published “On Denoting” (1905). See on this n. 15 
and Milkov (2020b). 
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The just-mentioned partial identity is based on the fact that the 
transition from one level to another (the world, the fact, the picture, 
the thought, the proposition, and its general form) is accomplished 
simply by arranging the elements of the preceding level in a new way 
(Art und Weise) (Milkov 2019). This means that, in a sense, the higher 
levels of Wittgenstein’s logic–ontology were a kind of doppelgänger 
of the basic levels—they are not autonomous entities. By way of a 
genealogical remark, the phrase “Art und Weise” was to be found at 
the very beginning (on p. 3) of the Ur-Tractatus in this form: “The 
proposition is the propositional sign plus the determinate relation (Art 
und Weise) of picturing” (3.2). This is an indication that Wittgenstein 
had this conception on his workbench from the very beginning.  
In short, in the Tractatus, Wittgenstein maintained that “in a state 
of affairs [in the atomic fact], objects stand in a determinate relation 
[Art und Weise] to one another” (2.031). In other words, states of 
affairs are nothing but “the determinate way in which objects are 
connected in [it]” (2.032). This connection gives us a topologically 
congruent tight “fitting” (passen) of the objects (of their boundaries) 
of the states of affairs of one and another, in a specific arrangement (in 
a specific way). According to this conception, the elements (the 
objects) in the state of affairs are not connected with the help of a 
third element, a mortar;
8
 they stick together through the topology of 
their boundaries alone. In other words, states of affairs are nothing but 
collections of invariant items (objects) ordered in a specific way 
(Milkov 2019, pp. 9 f.). They have no constitutive role. The other five 
transitions to a “higher” level of this openly branched ontology are 
made by the same token. Among other things, this position gave birth 
to Wittgenstein’s “eliminativism” in the Tractatus (see Milkov 2002a, 
p. 51), which follows the method of leaving all “third elements” aside. 
We find that the discovery of May 9, 1915 was the finishing piece 
in Wittgenstein’s early logical philosophy. He now believed that with 
                                                          
8
 “The elements [of a state of affairs] are not connected with one another by 
anything.” (1984, p. 252) 
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it, the main parts (building blocks) of his work were already there—
they only had to be synoptically ordered. Historically, this claim is 
supported by the fact that Wittgenstein started composing the 
Tractatus immediately after he made this discovery of May 9, 1915—
at the end of that month (Bazzocchi 2015).  
 
4. The Prototractatus Grows up From Six Cardinal 
Propositions 
Wittgenstein developed his project book in a peculiar fashion: he 
started with a series of six (partly) identical levels. To be more 
explicit, he formulated six cardinal propositions in which the world, 
the fact, the (logical) picture, the thought, the proposition, and its 
general propositional form were successively defined: 
 
(1) The world is all that is the case. 
(2) What is the case, the fact, is the existence of states of affairs. 
(3) A logical picture of facts is a thought. 
(4) A thought is a proposition with a sense. 
(5) A proposition is a truth-function of elementary propositions. 
(6) The general form of a truth-function is …. 
 
The six cardinal propositions of the Tractatus are self-sufficient but at 
the same time articulate six levels of dependency on each other—for 
example, thinking is ontologically dependent on the world, and 
language is logically dependent on thinking.
9
 
Next, out of his cardinal propositions Wittgenstein advanced a 
hierarchical “logical tree” out of which his project book developed 
further (Stern 2016, p. 205). More explicitly, the genealogical picture 
of composing the Tractatus showed up that it grew up in an organic, 
quasi-vegetal way, out of a bundle of six trunks. It comprised logical 
tree-branches that grew out of the bundle of six “trunks” of the book. 
                                                          
9
 “Language is [only] the method to express our thoughts in perceptible way.” 
(Wittgenstein 1980a, p. 235) 
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The implication of Wittgenstein’s adopting this approach was that the 
Tractatus was written as something like a collection of footnotes to 
the six cardinal propositions quoted above. In other words, the book 
“consists of remarks on remarks on remarks” (Mayer 1993, p. 114). 
But we can put this point also in another, perhaps more balanced 
perspective. According to it, the text of the book project was arranged 
to start up and evolve in six different levels that are in a relation of 
dependence: in different chains of thought following the six cardinal 
propositions. In this context, we can say that by composing the 
Tractatus, Wittgenstein followed the “hexaptych principle,” 
“hexaptych” meaning here a polyptych with six parts. This metaphor, 
however, has its own problems. The point is that each of these levels 
but the first one is superstructured over another so that the sixth level 
is superstructured, in this sense, five times. Apparently, this is not a 
conventional hexaptych. 
In the wake of new archaeological research into the composition 
of the Tractatus, interpreters like Peter Hacker and Luciano 
Bazzocchi, as well as the Iowa Tractatus Map, suggest a new way of 
reading the book. They claim, and we join them here, that “the book 
should be read as a hypertext, a tree-structure defined by the author’s 
numbering system. … [It should be read] not sequentially, from the 
beginning to end” (Stern 2016, p. 204). This suggestion was supported 
by the (only) footnote Wittgenstein added to the book:  
 
The digital numbers assigned to the individual propositions indicate the 
logical importance of the propositions and the stress laid on them in my 
exposition. The propositions n.1, n.2, n.3, etc. are comments on 
propositions no.n; the propositions n.m1, n.m2, etc. are comments on 
propositions no. n.m; and so on. 
 
There was also a new edition of the Tractatus that presented it in this 
way (Wittgenstein 2017).  
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Importantly enough, besides that Wittgenstein had quite solid 
theoretical grounds to follow this highly unusual method of presenting 
his ideas, it was also supported by the Doctrine of Showing, which he 
had on his workbench not later than in the end of 1913.
10
 It found 
expression, for example, in para. 6.1203 of the Tractatus, which 
claimed that the proposition “⁓(p.⁓q)” could also be written in the 
following manner: 
 
 
 
 
The idea was that a suitable graphical form of the logical notation also 
shows the logical properties of the world and of the language. In the 
“Notes Dictated to G E Moore in Norway,” the Doctrine of Showing 
was formulated thus: “in ‘aRb’, ‘R’ is not a symbol, but that ‘R’ is 
between one name and another symbolizes” (1979, p. 109). 
In short, Wittgenstein did not introduce the idiosyncratic method 
of exposing his ideas in the Tractatus simply for the sake of aesthetic 
perfectionism. Rather, his objective was to produce a surveyable 
presentation of his logic. In fact, “‘surveyable’ (übersichtlich, literally, 
overview-able) is a key term of art for Wittgenstein, and carries the 
sense of making it possible to take in a complex structure at a glance, 
in the way that one can grasp the lay of the land by looking at a 
landscape from a well-placed hill or tower” (Stern 2016, p. 215). 
Moreover, this position was already started by Frege (Milkov 1999).  
 
                                                          
10
 Wittgenstein communicated the Doctrine of Showing in a letter to Russell, in 
November 1913 (1979, p. 127ff.). 
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5. Putting the Pieces (the Logical–Philosophical Discoveries) 
Together in Good Order 
Let us now turn to the chronology of writing the Tractatus and to 
discuss in more detail its composing.  
In § 1, we have already noted that Wittgenstein composed the 
Tractatus in 12 phases. Phases I and II, in which Wittgenstein 
composed the Core-Tractatus, were creative. During this period 
Wittgenstein developed ideas that were to elucidate his cardinal 
propositions. After 28.03.1916, phase III started, which saw 
Wittgenstein simply integrate “the good propositions” of the “Notes 
on Logic” into his growing manuscript. In phase IV he also integrated 
the “good” propositions of his Notebooks I and II.11 At the end of 
1916, Wittgenstein wrote down some new propositions that were 
based on “Notes Dictated to G E Moore in Norway.” On the New 
Year Eve of 1916, the Proto-Prototractatus was finished. 
Wittgenstein’s book project now comprised 71 pages. In 1917 (phases 
VI and VII of the composition of the book
12
), he integrated the “good 
propositions” of “Notebooks” III. At the end of the year, the 
Prototractatus was finished. In 1918, Wittgenstein made some 
corrections to it, leading to the final version of the Tractatus.  
This chronology of composing the Tractatus, revealed by the 
recent archaeological studies of the book, confirms the suggestion that 
the early Wittgenstein used his old discoveries as finished building 
blocks out of which he concocted the book. In other words, what 
Wittgenstein incorporated in the upcoming Tractatus were not simply 
scattered fragments from his Notebooks but well-formed spolia that 
were integrated in his new masonry (Pilch 2018, p. 139, n. 82).  
Even if we leave the hypertext-order of the Tractatus out of 
consideration, the adoption of a synoptic method of working, 
connecting his logical–philosophical discoveries into a system after 
                                                          
11
 Notebooks I was kept from 22.08.1914 till 01.11.1914, Notebooks II from 
01.11.1914 till 20.06.1915, and Notebooks III, from 15.04.1916 till 10.01.1917. 
12
 These were composed in Vienna in early 1917. In Phase VI there are still no 
remarks on ethics (Pilch 2018, p. 109). 
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May 1915, produced a radical change in the style of his writing. This 
found expression in a letter to Russell from December 22, 1915, in 
which Wittgenstein wrote: “The method has changed drastically.” 
(1995, p. 102) Wittgenstein himself was conscious that his new style 
of expression made his text “very hard to understand without further 
explanation”13 (Ibid.).  
Most importantly, the Tractatus disrupted the natural evolvement 
of Wittgenstein’s thought—the meditation form of writing that was 
characteristic of the Notebooks (and also of the Philosophical 
Investigations)
14
 and increased the impression, also to himself, that he 
was a theoretical philosopher, producing a system. Among other 
things, this change of style was strengthened and supported by the 
adoption of the numbering system of Russell’s and Whitehead’s 
Principia mathematica in the book. 
 
6. The Emergence of Wittgenstein’s Anti-theoretical Stance 
Unfortunately, the natural development of Wittgenstein’s thought 
in these months worked in a direct opposition to this endeavor to 
promote a synoptic conception and also against any theoretical 
orientation. As we already have noted, when he started composing the 
Tractatus in June 1915, Wittgenstein believed that he was advancing a 
new theory. To be more explicit, as late as June 6, 1915, he spoke 
about a “picture-theory” (1979, p. 55). Apparently, at that point in 
time, Wittgenstein was convinced that he was a theoretical 
philosopher. Shortly afterward, however, Wittgenstein realized that 
the propositions of this “treatise” do not advance a theory at all. This 
was confirmed by the fact that after June 1915 he carefully avoided 
speaking about theory. 
In parallel, Wittgenstein also stopped speaking about “truth-
making.” Ostensibly, this was because the standard theory of truth-
                                                          
13
 Later, Wittgenstein himself noted that every sentence of the Tractatus must really 
be read as the title of a whole chapter (Rhees 1984, p. 159).  
14
 As Wittgenstein wrote in a letter to Russell, “the problems are becoming more and 
more lapidary and general.” (1995, p. 102) 
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making requires: (i) autonomous truth-makers: facts and states of affairs 
(in contrast, there are no autonomous truth-makers in the identity theory 
of truth
15
); (ii) autonomous truth-bearers, or propositions (Simons 1992). 
After adopting the partial identity between states of affairs and 
propositions in May 1915, however, these conditions cannot be met. 
Facts, states of affairs, and propositions were not autonomous 
anymore.  
 
7. When did Wittgenstein Realize that the Propositions of the 
Tractatus are Nonsensical? 
The new archaeological explorations in the composition of 
Wittgenstein’s Tractatus showed that the development of 
Wittgenstein’s thought was not as straightforward as one is usually 
inclined to believe. In fact, Wittgenstein’s Notebooks were an 
“experimental field for reflections in all directions” (Pilch 2018, 
p.122). A typical example is Wittgenstein note of 12.04.1915, which 
we already quoted in § 3: “I cannot bring out how far the proposition 
is the picture of the state of affairs. I am almost inclined to give up all 
my efforts.” (p. 41) After his discovery from 9.5.1915, that “the 
proposition is the picture of the fact” (p. 46), not of states of affairs, he 
stopped speaking about states of affairs altogether (and, incidentally, 
also about truth-functions
16
), only to reintroduce them after he 
restarted writing the Prototractatus.  
The evolvement of the Prototractatus clearly shows this palpable 
tension between a theoretical stance and anti-theoretical intuition in 
the early Wittgenstein. For example, in the process of composing the 
Prototractatus, the concept of model was gradually replaced by that of 
picture, so that in the Tractatus Wittgenstein spoke about models only 
                                                          
15
 Russell defended the identity theory of truth between 1900 and 1905. After 
composing “On Denoting,” however, he advanced the correspondence theory of 
truth, based on his famous multiple relation theory of judgment. Between September 
1913 and May 1915 Wittgenstein developed his limited identity theory of truth as a 
reaction to Russell’s new theory of judgment, which Wittgenstein criticised, starting 
June 1913. 
16
 We are not going to discuss this topic in the present paper. 
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three times, virtually opposing this term to picture, a term used dozens 
of time.
17
 Moreover, while working on the book, in several cases he 
replaced the word “model” with “picture.”18 Similar is the fate of the 
notion of “concatenation” (Verkettung) of objects (a term mentioned 
only in 4.122), which was gradually replaced by “connections” 
(Verbindung) of objects (it is mentioned 10 times in the Tractatus).  
Revealing the meandering development of Wittgenstein’s thought 
between 1914 and 1918 is instructive indeed. In particular, it helps to 
better understand his most controversial proposition, 6.54, that 
actually led to the “Tractarian wars.”19 To be more precise, 
Wittgenstein’s claim that the propositions of the Tractatus are 
nonsensical evolved at least in three steps:  
 
(i) First, at the end of the Core-Prototractatus (on p. 18), 
Wittgenstein started to maintain (while he was in Sokal, 
Galicia, late in 1915) that his very loose “theories” are 
nonsensical in the sense that they are not necessary. 
According to him now, “philosophy [only] aims at the logical 
clarification of thoughts. Philosophy is not a theory but an 
activity” (4.112).  
(ii) Months later, on p. 49 of the Proto-Prototractatus, while in 
Olomouc in the second half of 1916, Wittgenstein noted that 
“a philosophical work consists essentially of elucidations” 
(4.112). A little later, on p. 59, he “discovered” that we could 
also elucidate the primitive signs.
20
 
                                                          
17
 Among other things, this point shows that the interpretation of the Tractarian 
pictures as models (Mersch 2011, p. 23) is mistaken.  
18
 For example, on p. 3 of the “diplomatic presentation” of the Prototractatus: 
http://www.wittgensteinsource.org/PTT/PTT_A_1.pdf 
19
 Important as it was, the zigzagging progress of Wittgenstein’s thought with the 
composition of the Tractatus was not the main reason for the difficulties to 
understand it. The main difficulty, as we see it, is discussed in Milkov (2017). 
20
 Primitive signs were indefinable and, as Aristotle had already put it (Met., 
1039b27), the indefinables are ineffable. 
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(iii) Only in the second half of 1917, however (on p. 86), 
Wittgenstein wrote that the propositions of his book “serve as 
elucidations” (6.54). This discovery was followed by the 
insight that “anyone who understands me eventually 
recognizes them as nonsensical”21 (Ibid.). 
 
It is clear that when Wittgenstein started working on the Tractatus 
at the end of June 1915, he did not realize that his propositions are 
nonsensical. Apparently, Wittgenstein developed this position only 
after he became convinced that both his logical notation and his 
ontology had no constitutive role.
22
 They could only help by 
elucidating our thinking and language. At the end of the day, however, 
they are to be (or, more precisely, can be) eliminated, or thrown away.  
Significantly, Wittgenstein developed the idea of 6.54 while 
working on “the solution of the problems of life” (6.521).23 Besides, 
Wittgenstein realized that the propositions of his book were 
nonsensical after he reread the already composed Proto-
Prototractatus over and over again. This work made the real message 
of his work clearer to him. It helped him to develop a synoptic picture 
of the book. 
Unfortunately, Wittgenstein discovered this too late to change the 
architecture and the style of the book; he simply did not have the time 
to do that. To be sure, Wittgenstein wanted to publish his ideas, and he 
also knew very well that he would not survive the War. He considered 
finishing his work at the earliest as his main task.
24
 It was a race 
                                                          
21
 According to the “New Wittgensteinians,” these two propositions pertained to the 
“core propositions” of the Tractatus that were not meant “tongue in cheek.” In truth, 
they were written down at quite different times. 
22
 Regarding this see the penultimate paragraph of § 3 where we examined this in 
respect of the Tractarian ontology. We have shown there that the Tractarian logic 
has no constitutive role in (Milkov 2013, p. 203). 
23
 This work was supported by the reading of Leo Tolstoy’s interpretation of the 
New Testament. On how the discussion of these problems can lead to Wittgenstein’s 
“quietism” see Milkov (2003). 
24
 “You must get my manuscript printed whether anyone understands it or not,” 
wrote Wittgenstein to Russell on May 22, 1915 (1995, p.102). 
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against time. In contrast, in the early 1930s, when Wittgenstein 
decided to put his “later philosophy” in print, he had enough time to 
experiment with the style of articulating his thoughts. The experiments 
started with the Philosophical Remarks, Philosophical Grammar, and 
the Big Typescript, went through the Blue and the Brown Books, only 
to find an appropriate solution in the first version of the Philosophical 
Investigations (1936). 
 
8. Our Interpretation 
In order to better understand this most intricate proposition of 
Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, we will follow the interpretation we 
developed elsewhere (Milkov 2017). According to it, the objective of 
the Tractatus was similar to that of Frege in his Conceptual Notation, 
namely to set out a new, “perfect” symbolism.25 Among other things, 
it can help to discriminate between sense and nonsense, and so can 
make our thinking clearer. Once we learn, with the help of this 
symbolism, by way of mastering it, how our thinking works correctly, 
we do not need the symbolism anymore. At last resort, this means that 
the logical and conceptual distinctions that Wittgenstein made in the 
Tractatus were only needed in order to make our language and 
thinking better. When this objective is achieved, we can discard them.  
Importantly enough, the distinctions made in the Tractatus are not 
false. They simply are not necessary in order to think correctly. That is 
why they can be abandoned—but only when the logical symbolism is 
perfect and when the reader who understood it has also mastered it. 
As a result, the task to elaborate and to make good use of the perfect 
language is most important and can have particularly fruitful results. 
Among other things, this interpretation is supported by 
Wittgenstein’s remark in 6.54, which we already referred to in § 1, in 
particular, by his claim that the person who understood the 
propositions of the book recognized them as nonsensical only “when 
                                                          
25
 Another point that we are not going to discuss in this paper is that the Tractarian 
perfect symbolism has no constitutive import (see §§ 3, 7). 
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he has used them—as steps—to climb up beyond them. (He must, so 
to speak, throw away the ladder after he has climbed up it.)” (Italics 
added). Wittgenstein’s insistence on climbing up clearly points at a 
process of reaching a higher position, in our interpretation, in the 
process of mastering the perfect symbolism of the Tractatus.  
 
9. Epilogue 
The account given above shows that many ideas of the Tractatus 
could be easily presented as discoveries—in fact, they were 
pronounced as discoveries. In the process of composing the book, 
however, Wittgenstein gradually realized that they had no constitutive 
but only supportive role—the role of scaffolding. This point 
convincingly explained the concluding remark of the Tractatus: 
“Anyone who understands me eventually recognizes them [the 
propositions of the Tractatus] as nonsensical” (6.54).  
These two tendencies of the Tractatus made it notoriously difficult 
to understand. On the one hand, there were many theoretical winks in 
the work, but on the other hand, at the very end, it declares that they 
were “nonsensical.” These two contradictory tendencies in the book 
created the illusion of a seemingly theoretical study in philosophy that 
was essentially and effectively “nonsensical.” This ambiguity was also 
the main reason for the infamous “Tractarian Wars” between the 
“New” and “Old” Wittgensteinians. 
The anti-theoretical tendency in Wittgenstein’s outlook reached a 
new stage after 1929, when he clearly realized that the new ideas he 
pronounced in the Tractatus were not discoveries but conceptual 
remarks. Apparently, the progress of Wittgenstein’s eliminativism by 
composing the Tractatus was only a beginning of a development that 
ended in the radical eliminativism of his Philosophical 
Investigations.
26
 The proposition 6.54 simply marked an important 
step in this direction.  
                                                          
26
 We will discuss the eliminativism of Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations 
in another paper. 
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